"In examining any proposed end state, we must consider whether it guarantees an end to the fundamental problems that brought on the struggle in the first place, or whether instead it leaves in place the seeds of further conflict. If the latter, we must ask whether the chosen method of termination permits our unilateral resumption of military operations." -- MCDP 1-2: Campaigning
If the goal of any conflict is to end the conflict as soon as possible, you are only sowing the seeds of future conflict. Conflicting wills do not simply go away because the combat of hashing it out is inconvenient. Whatever elements led to the flash point will remain if the combat does not persist to the point of stamping out the variable that led to the vitriol.
The goal of conflict should NOT merely be to end the conflict, but to diffuse the bombs which made the conflict necessary. If you call for a peace treaty before the matters which caused the war have been addressed, you are only pausing the war, not ending it.
If an end to the fundamental problems is not reached, you must consider how the current cease fire affects your ability to begin firing on all cylinders again when future fighting invariably erupts.
James 4:1-2
What causes quarrels and what causes fights among you? Is it not this, that your passions are at war within you? You desire and do not have, so you murder. You covet and cannot obtain, so you fight and quarrel.
Saturday, March 14, 2020
Friday, March 13, 2020
day no. 15:117: method must bow to mission
"Rigidity inevitably defeats itself, and the analysts who point to a changed detail as evidence of a plan's weakness are completely unaware of the characteristics of the battlefield." - Dwight Eisenhower
"The farther ahead we project, the less certain and detailed should be our design. We may plan the initial phase of a campaign with some degree of certainty, developing extensive functional and detailed plans. However, since the results of that phase will shape the phases that follow, subsequent plans must be increasingly general. The plan for future phases will be largely conceptual, perhaps consisting of no more than a general intent and several contingencies and options."
"Plans are useless, but planning is indispensable." - Dwight Eisenhower
Planning forces you to consider all of your resources and liabilities as well as your enemy's center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. But in the moment, a center of gravity can move or a new vulnerability may present itself and one's plans must change.
Those auditing the procedure critically may accuse the commander of failing to achieve each objective, but they fail to account for the fact that the overall battle plan and objective was achieved precisely by abandoning the earlier plan. You have to keep the overall goal in mind as you execute the orders. When things change, an eye on the end can help you adjust to real time, unpredictable developments that still lead you to the same end you planned from the git go. If you are more committed to seeing your plan go according to its blueprint, you may actually fail to achieve the overall objective in the process.
Mission determines method and methods must adapt in order to accomplish the mission.
Method must bow to mission.
"The farther ahead we project, the less certain and detailed should be our design. We may plan the initial phase of a campaign with some degree of certainty, developing extensive functional and detailed plans. However, since the results of that phase will shape the phases that follow, subsequent plans must be increasingly general. The plan for future phases will be largely conceptual, perhaps consisting of no more than a general intent and several contingencies and options."
"Plans are useless, but planning is indispensable." - Dwight Eisenhower
Planning forces you to consider all of your resources and liabilities as well as your enemy's center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. But in the moment, a center of gravity can move or a new vulnerability may present itself and one's plans must change.
Those auditing the procedure critically may accuse the commander of failing to achieve each objective, but they fail to account for the fact that the overall battle plan and objective was achieved precisely by abandoning the earlier plan. You have to keep the overall goal in mind as you execute the orders. When things change, an eye on the end can help you adjust to real time, unpredictable developments that still lead you to the same end you planned from the git go. If you are more committed to seeing your plan go according to its blueprint, you may actually fail to achieve the overall objective in the process.
Mission determines method and methods must adapt in order to accomplish the mission.
Method must bow to mission.
Thursday, March 12, 2020
day no. 15,116: the body politic
"The fingers have to know what the brain is feeling for, and the brain has to know what the fingers are actually touching." -- MCDP 1-2: Campaigning
The brain thinks on behalf of the entire body and the fingers feel on behalf of the entire body. The brain is not responsible for feeling, but it is responsible for listening to what the fingers are saying. The fingers are not responsible for thinking, but they must report to the brain what they're feeling if they want to benefit the body.
Romans 12:4-5
For as in one body we have many members, and the members do not all have the same function, so we, though many, are one body in Christ, and individually members one of another.
In the body, there are different parts with different functions and differing levels of responsibility and accountability. There is a hierarchy and it is not a result of inadequacy, inferiority or sin. The fingers report to the brain by design and not because of a broken system. To the contrary, it is the healthy body whose brain informs it fingers with direction and whose fingers report what they're finding back to the brain with alacrity.
1 Corinthians 12:12
For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ.
The brain thinks on behalf of the entire body and the fingers feel on behalf of the entire body. The brain is not responsible for feeling, but it is responsible for listening to what the fingers are saying. The fingers are not responsible for thinking, but they must report to the brain what they're feeling if they want to benefit the body.
Romans 12:4-5
For as in one body we have many members, and the members do not all have the same function, so we, though many, are one body in Christ, and individually members one of another.
In the body, there are different parts with different functions and differing levels of responsibility and accountability. There is a hierarchy and it is not a result of inadequacy, inferiority or sin. The fingers report to the brain by design and not because of a broken system. To the contrary, it is the healthy body whose brain informs it fingers with direction and whose fingers report what they're finding back to the brain with alacrity.
1 Corinthians 12:12
For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ.
Wednesday, March 11, 2020
day no. 15,115: homiletical help, week 8: not just any words will do --> CLARITY PT. 2
Good morning messengers,
Preachers are like magnifying glasses. They don't create the words on the page, but they do help people see them more clearly. Our words should magnify the words on the page so that people remember the Words of God, not the magnifying glass. In other words, our words should be see through in order to better illuminate His Words after hearing ours.
This week, let's again talk about CLARITY: which words to say what
This week, though, let's talk about illustrations and anecdotes. Illustrations can serve as good come up for air moments, but they must illustrate something. They can't help it; after all, they are illustrations. It's what they do.
2 CORINTHIANS 4:5
For what we proclaim is not ourselves, but Jesus Christ as Lord, with ourselves as your servants for Jesus' sake.
Do our illustrations give people a better sense of the text? A better sense of what God has said and is saying? Or do they only provide insight into our own lives?
If an illustration is memorable, but the point of the illustration is foggy, the illustration has failed. While memorable and providing insight into the preacher's life, it does nothing to help further the point the text was making if everyone remembers the punch line, but no one remembers the written lines.
These are what I have called, "illustractions." They illustrate something, just not the text. Their main point is off the main point and serve not to help the message along, but rather to compete with the message for attention.
Illustrations should not be spelled with three "i's" The main point of an anecdote cannot be the preacher. There are already enough "I's" in illustrations. Don't add a third by making it about you.
Road signs make lame destinations; they do, however, give great directions.
For your next sermon, really think about the stories, illustrations and anecdotes you use. Are they illustractions? Do they have one too many "i's" in them?
Tuesday, March 10, 2020
day no. 15,114: sagacity makes swords sharper
"Strategic execution is not simply carrying out a fixed plan. Rather, it is a complex matter of both initiating action and effectively responding to events as they unfold. Without proper grounding in the strategic situation, the political and military objectives of the strategy, and the strategic concept, Marines will not be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances... There is no shortcut to strategic wisdom.
We must think about these concepts, internalize them, and constantly seek to improve our understanding of the strategic environment. Such an understanding, based on a professional approach to the complexities of war and politics, is the essence of 'fighting smart.'"-- MCDP 1-1: Strategy
Proverbs 11:14
Where there is no guidance, a people falls,
but in an abundance of counselors there is safety.
People fall because there are holes and they don't know where they are. We live in a world where you can trip over things and fall into other things. There is no use pretending them away or wishing they weren't there. But merely admitting them is not a win if you still don't know where they are.
Proverbs 20:18
Plans are established by counsel;
by wise guidance wage war.
Wisdom knows how to fight. Wisdom will help you know when to fight, what's worth fighting about and how to fight when it's a hill worth dying upon.
Proverbs 24:5-6
A wise man is full of strength,
and a man of knowledge enhances his might,
for by wise guidance you can wage your war,
and in abundance of counselors there is victory.
Wisdom makes might mightier. Sagacity makes a sword sharper, more deadly. Wisdom is a better warrior than mere weight. Muscle can move things, but the mind moves the muscle.
We must think about these concepts, internalize them, and constantly seek to improve our understanding of the strategic environment. Such an understanding, based on a professional approach to the complexities of war and politics, is the essence of 'fighting smart.'"-- MCDP 1-1: Strategy
Proverbs 11:14
Where there is no guidance, a people falls,
but in an abundance of counselors there is safety.
People fall because there are holes and they don't know where they are. We live in a world where you can trip over things and fall into other things. There is no use pretending them away or wishing they weren't there. But merely admitting them is not a win if you still don't know where they are.
Proverbs 20:18
Plans are established by counsel;
by wise guidance wage war.
Wisdom knows how to fight. Wisdom will help you know when to fight, what's worth fighting about and how to fight when it's a hill worth dying upon.
Proverbs 24:5-6
A wise man is full of strength,
and a man of knowledge enhances his might,
for by wise guidance you can wage your war,
and in abundance of counselors there is victory.
Wisdom makes might mightier. Sagacity makes a sword sharper, more deadly. Wisdom is a better warrior than mere weight. Muscle can move things, but the mind moves the muscle.
Monday, March 9, 2020
day no. 15,113: strategy tragedies as per the MCDP 1-1
STRATEGY-MAKING PITFALLS
Given the complexity of making strategy, it is understandable that some seek ways to simplify the process. There are several traps into which would-be strategists commonly fall:
searching for strategic panaceas; emphasizing process over product in strategy making; seeking the single, decisive act, the fait accompli; attempting to simplify the nature of the
problem by using labels such as limited or unlimited wars; falling into a paralysis of inaction; or rushing to a conclusion recklessly.
Strategic Panaceas
Strategists have long sought strategic panaceas: strategic prescriptions that will guarantee victory in any situation. The strategic panacea denies any need for understanding the unique characteristics of each strategic situation, offering instead a ready-made and universal solution.
Emphasizing Process Over Product
The second major trap is the attempt to reduce the strategy making process to a routine. The danger in standardizing strategy-making procedures is that the leadership may believe
that the process alone will ensure development of sound strategies.
Such systems are vitally necessary. They impose a degree of order that enables the human mind to cope with the otherwise overwhelming complexity of politics and war. However,
they may also generate friction and rigidity. Standardized strategies can be valuable as a point of departure for tailored strategies or as elements of larger tailored strategies. However, when the entire process is run by routine, the results are predictable strategies by default that adversaries can easily anticipate and counter.
The Fait Accompli
A fait accompli is an accomplished fact, or fait accoinpli—political/military achievement that
simply cannot be undone. A coup d'etat is usually designed as a fait accompli. The fait accompli is another potential strategic pitfall. It is immensely attractive to political leaders because it seems neat and clean—even "surgical." The danger is that many attempted
faits accomplis end up as merely the opening gambit in what turns out to be a long-term conflict or commitment.
Limited and Unlimited Wars
Another common error is the attempt to characterize a war as either "limited" or "unlimited." While we can generally classify the political and military objectives of any individual belligerent in a war as limited or unlimited, seldom can we accurately characterize the conflict itself as limited or unlimited. To do so may leave us badly confused about the actual dynamics of a conflict.
Another common error is the assumption that limited wars are small wars and unlimited wars are big ones. This confuses the scale of a war with its military and political objectives. Large-scale wars can be quite limited in political and/or military objectives, while a relatively small conflict may have unlimited political and military objectives.
The strategic pitfall in characterizing wars as limited or unlimited is that such a label may lead to adoption of an incorrect strategy. This is particularly true in the case of limited wars. There are always temptations to limit the military means employed, even when the political objectives demand a strategy of annihilation. Such inclinations stem from the psychological and moral burdens involved in the use of force, the desire to conserve resources, and often a tendency to underestimate the enemy or the overall problem. Strategists must correctly understand the character and the resource demands of a strategy before they choose it.
Paralysis and Recklessness
Successful decisions may lead to great gains, but failure can lead to fearful losses. Some personalities instinctively respond to this environment with a hold-the-line, take-no-chances mentality. Others display an irresistible bias for action.
Unless we understand the specific problems, dangers, and potential gains of a situation, the two approaches are equally dangerous. Paralysis is neither more nor less dangerous than
blindly striking out in the face of either threat or opportunity. Unfortunately, the very process of attempting to ascertain the particulars can lead to "paralysis by analysis."Strategy makers almost always have to plan and act in the absence of complete information or without a full comprehension of the situation.
At the same time, strategists must guard against making hasty or ill-conceived decisions. The strategic realm differs from the tactical arena both in the pace at which events occur and the consequences of actions taken. Rarely does the strategic decision maker have to act instantaneously. The development of strategy demands a certain discipline to study and understand the dynamics of a situation and think through the implications of potential actions. While it is often possible to recover from a tactical error or a defeat, the consequences of a serious misstep at the strategic level can be catastrophic. Boldness and decisiveness, which are important characteristics of leadership at any level, must at the strategic level be tempered with an appropriate sense of balance and perspective.
The strategist's responsibility is to balance opportunity against risk and to balance both against uncertainty. Despite the obstacles to focusing on specific strategic problems and to
taking effective action, we must focus, and we must act. Success is clearly possible.
Given the complexity of making strategy, it is understandable that some seek ways to simplify the process. There are several traps into which would-be strategists commonly fall:
searching for strategic panaceas; emphasizing process over product in strategy making; seeking the single, decisive act, the fait accompli; attempting to simplify the nature of the
problem by using labels such as limited or unlimited wars; falling into a paralysis of inaction; or rushing to a conclusion recklessly.
Strategic Panaceas
Strategists have long sought strategic panaceas: strategic prescriptions that will guarantee victory in any situation. The strategic panacea denies any need for understanding the unique characteristics of each strategic situation, offering instead a ready-made and universal solution.
Emphasizing Process Over Product
The second major trap is the attempt to reduce the strategy making process to a routine. The danger in standardizing strategy-making procedures is that the leadership may believe
that the process alone will ensure development of sound strategies.
Such systems are vitally necessary. They impose a degree of order that enables the human mind to cope with the otherwise overwhelming complexity of politics and war. However,
they may also generate friction and rigidity. Standardized strategies can be valuable as a point of departure for tailored strategies or as elements of larger tailored strategies. However, when the entire process is run by routine, the results are predictable strategies by default that adversaries can easily anticipate and counter.
The Fait Accompli
A fait accompli is an accomplished fact, or fait accoinpli—political/military achievement that
simply cannot be undone. A coup d'etat is usually designed as a fait accompli. The fait accompli is another potential strategic pitfall. It is immensely attractive to political leaders because it seems neat and clean—even "surgical." The danger is that many attempted
faits accomplis end up as merely the opening gambit in what turns out to be a long-term conflict or commitment.
Limited and Unlimited Wars
Another common error is the attempt to characterize a war as either "limited" or "unlimited." While we can generally classify the political and military objectives of any individual belligerent in a war as limited or unlimited, seldom can we accurately characterize the conflict itself as limited or unlimited. To do so may leave us badly confused about the actual dynamics of a conflict.
Another common error is the assumption that limited wars are small wars and unlimited wars are big ones. This confuses the scale of a war with its military and political objectives. Large-scale wars can be quite limited in political and/or military objectives, while a relatively small conflict may have unlimited political and military objectives.
The strategic pitfall in characterizing wars as limited or unlimited is that such a label may lead to adoption of an incorrect strategy. This is particularly true in the case of limited wars. There are always temptations to limit the military means employed, even when the political objectives demand a strategy of annihilation. Such inclinations stem from the psychological and moral burdens involved in the use of force, the desire to conserve resources, and often a tendency to underestimate the enemy or the overall problem. Strategists must correctly understand the character and the resource demands of a strategy before they choose it.
Paralysis and Recklessness
Successful decisions may lead to great gains, but failure can lead to fearful losses. Some personalities instinctively respond to this environment with a hold-the-line, take-no-chances mentality. Others display an irresistible bias for action.
Unless we understand the specific problems, dangers, and potential gains of a situation, the two approaches are equally dangerous. Paralysis is neither more nor less dangerous than
blindly striking out in the face of either threat or opportunity. Unfortunately, the very process of attempting to ascertain the particulars can lead to "paralysis by analysis."Strategy makers almost always have to plan and act in the absence of complete information or without a full comprehension of the situation.
At the same time, strategists must guard against making hasty or ill-conceived decisions. The strategic realm differs from the tactical arena both in the pace at which events occur and the consequences of actions taken. Rarely does the strategic decision maker have to act instantaneously. The development of strategy demands a certain discipline to study and understand the dynamics of a situation and think through the implications of potential actions. While it is often possible to recover from a tactical error or a defeat, the consequences of a serious misstep at the strategic level can be catastrophic. Boldness and decisiveness, which are important characteristics of leadership at any level, must at the strategic level be tempered with an appropriate sense of balance and perspective.
The strategist's responsibility is to balance opportunity against risk and to balance both against uncertainty. Despite the obstacles to focusing on specific strategic problems and to
taking effective action, we must focus, and we must act. Success is clearly possible.
Sunday, March 8, 2020
day no. 15,112: jus ad bellum and jus in bello per MCDP 1-1
"If you decide to fight, you also have to decide to win." - Luther (2003 Film)
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JUST WAR
Traditionally, Western societies have demanded two things of their strategic leaders in war. First is success, which contributes to security and societal well-being. Second is a sense of being in the right, a belief that the cause for which the people are called to sacrifice is a just one. Strategists must be able to reconcile what is necessary with what is just. The "just war" theory provides a set of criteria that can help to reconcile these practical and moral considerations.
Just war theory has two components, labeled in Latin jus ad bellum (literally, "rightness in going to war") and jus in bello ("rightness in the conduct of war"). There are seven jus ad bellum criteria:
• Just Cause. A just cause involves the protection and preservation of value. There are three such causes: defense of self or of others against attack, retaking of something wrongly taken by force, and punishment of concrete wrongs done by an evil power.
• Right Authority. The person or body authorizing the war must be a responsible representative of a sovereign political entity.
• Right Intention. The intent in waging war must truly be just and not be a selfish aim masked as a just cause.
• Proportionality of Ends. The overall good achieved by the resort to war must not be outweighed by the harm it produces.
• Last Resort. We must show that there is no logical alternative to violence.
• Reasonable Hope of Success. There can be neither moral nor strategic justification for resorting to war when there is no hope of success.
• The Aim of Peace. Ends for which a war is fought must include the establishment of stability and peace.
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