Monday, March 9, 2020

day no. 15,113: strategy tragedies as per the MCDP 1-1

STRATEGY-MAKING PITFALLS
Given the complexity of making strategy, it is understandable that some seek ways to simplify the process. There are several traps into which would-be strategists commonly fall:
searching for strategic panaceas; emphasizing process over product in strategy making; seeking the single, decisive act, the fait accompli; attempting to simplify the nature of the
problem by using labels such as limited or unlimited wars; falling into a paralysis of inaction; or rushing to a conclusion recklessly.

Strategic Panaceas

Strategists have long sought strategic panaceas: strategic prescriptions that will guarantee victory in any situation. The strategic panacea denies any need for understanding the unique characteristics of each strategic situation, offering instead a ready-made and universal solution.

Emphasizing Process Over Product

The second major trap is the attempt to reduce the strategy making process to a routine. The danger in standardizing strategy-making procedures is that the leadership may believe
that the process alone will ensure development of sound strategies.

Such systems are vitally necessary. They impose a degree of order that enables the human mind to cope with the otherwise overwhelming complexity of politics and war. However,

they may also generate friction and rigidity. Standardized strategies can be valuable as a point of departure for tailored strategies or as elements of larger tailored strategies. However, when the entire process is run by routine, the results are predictable strategies by default that adversaries can easily anticipate and counter.

The Fait Accompli

A fait accompli is an accomplished fact, or fait accoinpli—political/military achievement that
simply cannot be undone. A coup d'etat is usually designed as a fait accompli. The fait accompli is another potential strategic pitfall. It is immensely attractive to political leaders because it seems neat and clean—even "surgical." The danger is that many attempted
faits accomplis end up as merely the opening gambit in what turns out to be a long-term conflict or commitment.

Limited and Unlimited Wars

Another common error is the attempt to characterize a war as either "limited" or "unlimited." While we can generally classify the political and military objectives of any individual belligerent in a war as limited or unlimited, seldom can we accurately characterize the conflict itself as limited or unlimited. To do so may leave us badly confused about the actual dynamics of a conflict.

Another common error is the assumption that limited wars are small wars and unlimited wars are big ones. This confuses the scale of a war with its military and political 
objectives. Large-scale wars can be quite limited in political and/or military objectives, while a relatively small conflict may have unlimited political and military objectives.

The strategic pitfall in characterizing wars as limited or unlimited is that such a label may lead to adoption of an incorrect strategy. This is particularly true in the case of limited wars. There are always temptations to limit the military means employed, even when the political objectives demand a strategy of annihilation. Such inclinations stem from the psychological and moral burdens involved in the use of force, the desire to conserve resources, and often a tendency to underestimate the enemy or the overall problem. Strategists must correctly understand the character and the resource demands of a strategy before they choose it.

Paralysis and Recklessness

Successful decisions may lead to great gains, but failure can lead to fearful losses. Some personalities instinctively respond to this environment with a hold-the-line, take-no-chances mentality. Others display an irresistible bias for action.

Unless we understand the specific problems, dangers, and potential gains of a situation, the two approaches are equally dangerous. Paralysis is neither more nor less dangerous than

blindly striking out in the face of either threat or opportunity. Unfortunately, the very process of attempting to ascertain the particulars can lead to "paralysis by analysis."Strategy makers almost always have to plan and act in the absence of complete information or without a full comprehension of the situation.

At the same time, strategists must guard against making hasty or ill-conceived decisions. The strategic realm differs from the tactical arena both in the pace at which events occur and the consequences of actions taken. Rarely does the strategic decision maker have to act instantaneously. The development of strategy demands a certain discipline to study and understand the dynamics of a situation and think through the implications of potential actions. While it is often possible to recover from a tactical error or a defeat, the consequences of a serious misstep at the strategic level can be catastrophic. Boldness and decisiveness, which are important characteristics of leadership at any level, must at the strategic level be tempered with an appropriate sense of balance and perspective.

The strategist's responsibility is to balance opportunity against risk and to balance both against uncertainty. Despite the obstacles to focusing on specific strategic problems and to
taking effective action, we must focus, and we must act. Success is clearly possible.

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